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1. Introduction  
Given the threat of global climate change resulting from greenhouse gas emissions, there is 
considerable interest in policies that aim to facilitate the substitution of renewable energy for 
conventional fossil fuels. In addition to correcting the market failure of a pollution externality, it is 
recognized that policies that promote adoption of renewable energy also have the potential to affect 
incentives for innovation in better renewable technologies. Indeed, because of the scale of the 
problem at hand, the role of research and development (R&D) activities is crucial if a sustainable 
long-term solution is to be attained (Barrett 2009, Popp 2010). The process of innovation is itself 
fraught with market failures, and most policy tools are imperfectly suited to tackle both the pollution 
mitigation objective and the innovation challenge (Jaffe, Newell and Stavins 2003). A considerable 
body of work has analyzed the performance of alternative environmental policies vis-à-vis their 
impact on innovation. The dichotomy of prices versus quantity tools is a recurrent theme in this 
literature, which has privileged the comparison of carbon taxes with (tradable) pollution permits. 
The presence of multiple market failures has tended to make ranking of various policies options 
inconclusive (Fischer, Parry and Pizer 2003), although the balance of evidence reviewed by Requate 
(2005) appears to favor price-based policies. Existing analytical models, however, do not seem to 
apply well to a type of quantity tools that has become increasingly popular in recent years: quantity 
“mandates” that require a certain fraction of consumption to be accounted for by renewable energy. 
Mandates set a target for renewable energy production, and it falls upon the producers and suppliers 
of energy to meet this quota. Renewable portfolio standards are a prominent example of this kind of 
policy and, as of 2011, were used in 27 US states (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011), and six 
European countries (Haas et al. 2011). Renewable portfolio standards mandate that suppliers of 
electricity source a set percentage of electricity from renewable sources such as solar, wind, biomass, 
and hydroelectric providers (Holland 2012). A more direct example is perhaps provided by US 
biofuel policies. The use of mandates is one of the distinctive features of the 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA), which envisioned overall biofuel use as transportation fuel 
in the United States to grow to 36 billion gallons by 2022 (Moschini, Cui and Lapan 2012). Whereas 
the ability of such mandates to engineer increased adoption of renewable energy is clear, their 
effectiveness at reducing pollution has been at times controversial, as has the impact on welfare 
(because of unintended effects, e.g., the food vs. fuel debate) (Janda, Kristoufek and Zilberman 
2012). Even less is known about the other critical feature noted above: the ability of corrective 
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policies to induce environmental innovation. In this paper we undertake to study this particular 
question: just how effective are mandates at promoting innovation? 
Interest in the question posed in this paper can be highlighted by the experience with US biofuel 
policies. Mandates have been effective at spurring the growth of the corn-based ethanol industry, 
which steadily accumulated the capacity required to produce the mandated targets in a timely 
fashion. But in order to meet the ambitious targets set out by EISA, a major role is envisioned for 
advanced biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol: 21 of the 36 billion gallons of biofuels mandated by 
2022 are supposed to come from advanced biofuels. The experience, so far, has been disappointing: 
for several years now, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has essentially waived the 
mandate for cellulosic ethanol. In their latest ruling, for 2014 the EPA proposed to blend a mere 17 
million gallons of cellulosic ethanol into the fuel supply, down from the EISA statutory requirement 
of 1,750 million gallons (EPA 2013). An obvious distinction between corn-based ethanol and 
cellulosic ethanol is that the former is produced with a mature technology, whereas the latter 
requires new technological breakthrough to make it scalable and commercially viable. For advanced 
biofuels, therefore, mandates were really supposed to spur sufficient innovation. Is that a legitimate 
expectation for a policy tool such as mandates? And, if innovation is the crux of the issue, how do 
mandates compare with a more standard environmental policy tool such as a carbon tax? 
In this paper we analyze the scope of mandates as a tool to promote environmental innovation. 
Specifically, we consider a market with clean and dirty energy sources that are close substitutes, e.g., 
renewable energy and fossil fuels. The dirty energy imposes a negative externality on society. The 
clean energy has no such externality, and the cost of producing it can be lowered through R&D. 
Following the approach introduced by Parry (1995), Laffont and Tirole (1996) and Denicolo (1999), 
we view the R&D sector as separate from the production sector adopting the new technology. The 
profit opportunity that motivates innovators is directly influenced by environmental policies that 
penalize dirty energy use or reward clean energy use, and it is mediated by patents. The latter are 
known to permit only imperfect appropriability of the innovation’s benefits, which generally leads to 
under-provision of R&D. Indeed, for environmental innovations where the underlying externality is 
not fully internalized by private agents, this under-provision problem is believed to be most acute 
(Jaffe, Newell and Stavins 2005). Because we wish to emphasize the innovation challenges posed 
specifically by environmental externalities, rather than the general problem of spurring innovation in 
a market setting, here we take the second-best nature of patents as given and ignore other policy 
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instruments that deal with innovation in general (Clancy and Moschini 2013). In this setting, no 
environmental policy measure can lead to a first best outcome by itself. The effectiveness of 
mandates at spurring environmental innovation, therefore, is best understood as compared to a well-
defined alternative. Hence, we compare the innovation effects of a mandate with those of a carbon 
tax (the standard implementation tool of price-based policies).  
The incentive to innovate induced by environmental policies has been studied either in a 
deterministic (Denicolo 1999; Fischer, Parry and Pizer 2003; Scotchmer 2010) or stochastic setting 
(Biglaiser and Horowitz 1994; Parry 1995; Laffont and Tirole 1996). To fit the distinctive policy 
challenge of bringing about new technologies such as advanced biofuels, a stochastic framework 
seems most appropriate. Accordingly, in the model we develop, a firm that invests in R&D gets an 
independent draw of a cost-reducing technology for the production of renewable energy. We model 
both the case of a single innovator and the case of multiple innovators. For the latter case, 
innovators engage in a form of Bertrand competition, so that the firm with the best innovation is the 
exclusive licensor, but the price that can be charged is constrained by the firm with the next-best 
innovation. Multiple innovators can raise welfare through two channels: an increase in the number 
of innovating firms increases the expected quality of the best innovation that will discovered, and, 
the ex post royalty rate for the best innovation is reduced by the presence of competitors.1 This 
formulation allows us to capture, in an effective and explicit way, the spillover effect of innovations, 
and the associated imperfect appropriability problem that is one of the roots of R&D 
underprovision. Another feature of our model is a plausible presumption about the innovation 
process: when they choose R&D investments firms have better information than policy makers do 
when they set the policy. This information asymmetry may stem either from the specialized 
knowledge of firms, or from the policy-maker’s need to set the policy several years in advance, so 
that it cannot respond to scientific and technological developments (as in the case of the advanced 
biofuels mandate). To evaluate and compare policies, however, we take the ex ante perspective of 
policy makers who know the distribution of innovation prospects but do not know the actual 
information possessed by innovators. 
                                                          
1 Because of our focus on R&D incentives, we do not attempt to distinguish between the stages of 
innovation and diffusion that customarily play distinct roles in this setting (Popp, Newell and Jaffe 
2010). In our model diffusion is implicitly assumed to be costless, except for the license fee charged 
by the innovator). 
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Two additional features of our modeling framework deserve a brief discussion. First, we assume that 
the marginal environmental damage of the externality is constant. This commonly invoked 
condition, together with the assumption that the conditional distribution of firms’ innovation 
outcomes is uniform, simplifies the analysis considerably and permits the derivation of explicit 
results. In addition to its analytical attractiveness, this assumption might be appropriate for the case 
of renewable energy that motivates our analysis. For example, cellulosic ethanol can only address a 
small portion of the overall energy needs of the economy, and innovations in this area are likely to 
have a limited impact on the overall level of carbon emission. Furthermore, the energy sector’s 
emissions are small relative to the cumulative stock of emissions, which is what ultimately drives 
climate change. Hence, a linear damage function is arguably appropriate in our context, at least as a 
local approximation to a convex damage function. A second modeling issue arises because of the 
dynamic implications of R&D incentives. The challenge of devising optimal policies in this context 
has to deal with Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) time consistency problem: once new less-polluting 
technologies are developed, policy makers might want to change environmental rules, and this ex post 
policy adjustment alters the innovator’s ex ante incentives. Whether or not policy makers can credibly 
commit to an environmental policy course, therefore, is of considerable importance (Laffont and 
Tirole 1996, Denicolo 1999). In our model, having assumed constant marginal environmental 
damages, the naïve carbon tax that we consider in the analytical section is actually unaffected by the 
realization of the innovation (Kennedy and Laplante 1999). The optimal mandate and the optimal 
carbon tax that we consider in the numerical analysis, on the other hand, are not time-consistent. 
When comparing the performance of mandates with the carbon tax, however, we assume that 
policymakers have committed to their policy.  
Our results show that mandates can in fact improve upon laissez faire, and that the prospect of 
innovation is essential for the desirability of mandates. However, mandates suffer from several 
limitations and are generally inferior to a carbon tax. We find that a mandate, besides leading to a 
sub-optimal static equilibrium compared to a carbon tax, also leads to different innovation 
outcomes. In particular, we find that a mandate is relatively good at incentivizing incremental 
innovation but a poor spur to breakthrough innovation, as compared with a carbon tax. Mandates 
also lead to inferior welfare outcomes relative to carbon taxes. In addition to welfare and expected 
technology results, we highlight the differential distributions of realized technology that different 
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policies can induce. Specifically, we show that carbon taxes induce a more disperse distribution of 
innovation (either very good or none at all) than a mandate. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out our model for the case of a 
single innovator. Section 3 explicitly compares the mandate policy with the naïve carbon tax when 
there is one innovator. In Section 4, we extend the model to allow for free entry into the innovation 
sector. Section 5 compares the mandate policy with the carbon tax when there are multiple 
innovators. Section 6 uses a numerical simulation to compare the performance of the two policy 
instruments (mandate and carbon tax) when their level is set “optimally,” i.e., accounting for both 
the externality correction and innovation. This permits us to consider more general welfare 
conclusions than those derived in the analytical section, and to explore the robustness of our results 
to the relaxing of certain conditions. We conclude with a summary of our findings, additional 
discussion of policy implications, and some thoughts about further research. 
2. The Model 
We model innovation as a purposeful economic activity undertaken by firms seeking to profit from 
licensing the implementation of their successful ideas. The innovation of interest is modeled as a 
replacement technology, rather than an abatement technology (another common approach to study 
environmental innovations). Specifically, we focus on the introduction of a new product that can 
substitute for an existing product that produces a negative environmental externality. The new 
product is cleaner—in fact, without much loss of generality, we will assume that this new product 
has zero emissions. Our modeling of innovation as a replacement technology is consistent with the 
approach of Denicolo (1999), Laffont and Tirole (1996), and Scotchmer (2011), among others. This 
approach has also recently been used in the context of climate change (Acemoglu et al. 2012), and 
fits well the renewable versus conventional fossil fuel context. A distinctive feature of our approach, 
however, is to model innovation explicitly as a stochastic process. As in Scotchmer (2004), we 
postulate that innovators decide whether or not to conduct R&D after obtaining a draw from the 
space of ideas. We extend this approach by assuming that these draws give the innovator only a 
signal about the likely quality of innovation, but the latter remains stochastic. Furthermore, whereas 
innovators are assumed to observe the signal of technological opportunity prior to making the R&D 
investment, we presume that the policy setting is determined in advance of the realization of this 
signal. When comparing alternative policy instruments (carbon tax and mandates), the relevant ex 
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ante perspective therefore is that of the policy maker, who knows the distribution of all possible 
signals but does not observe the realization that drives innovators’ decisions. Our stochastic model 
has other attractive features, including that of permitting an explicit characterization of the multiple 
innovators setting. Furthermore, this approach is amenable to numerical analysis, which we use to 
supplement the analytical results.  
Consumers are assumed to have quasilinear preferences for a numeraire good and energy Q , with the 
aggregate inverse demand for energy given by ( )P Q , where ( ) 0P Q′ < . There are two forms of 
energy: an older and dirty form of energy, denoted 1Q , and a new renewable and clean form of 
energy, denoted 2Q . These two sources of energy are perfect substitutes from the consumer’s 
perspective, and thus we can represent total energy used as 1 2Q Q Q= + . Total damage from 
emission is 1X xQ= , where x  is the (constant) marginal environmental damage rate. A feature of 
the innovation context that we wish to model is the fact that the renewable source of energy in 
question is unlikely to be able to completely supplant the conventional source, and, relative to the 
latter, it is expected to be at a scalability disadvantage in both production and distribution. To 
capture this asymmetry, we assume that the production of the older product displays constant 
returns to scale at the industry level, whereas renewable energy is produced under decreasing returns 
to scale at the industry level. Furthermore, whereas the analysis that we present does not restrict the 
shape of the inverse demand function ( )P Q , to obtain clear results (especially for the multiple 
innovators case) we find it convenient to restrict attention to linear industry marginal cost schedules. 
More specifically, if 1 1( )C Q  and 2 2( , )C Q θ  denote the industry cost functions for the two products, 
conventional energy is assumed to be produced by a perfectly competitive industry with constant 
marginal cost, i.e.,  
 1 1 1
1
( )C Q c
Q
∂
=
∂
            (1) 
whereas the new clean technology displays an upward-sloping marginal cost function:  
 ( )2 2 2 2
2
,C Q
c Q
Q
θ
θ
∂
= − +
∂
        (2) 
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where 1c  and 2c  are fixed parameters, with >2 1c c , and θ  is an index of technological progress 
that captures the impact of innovation.2 This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Conventional and renewable energy: Innovation, supply and demand  
 
Initially, 0θ = . The innovation process consist of R&D projects, each of which can produce a draw 
0θ ≥  upon incurring a (fixed) cost 0k > . As exemplified in (2), innovation lowers the marginal 
cost of producing renewable energy. More specifically, to develop a new production technology, 
innovators first receive a draw of ω  from a known cumulative probability distribution ( )G ω  with 
domain [ ]0,ω . Given ω , the researcher may choose to pay k  to obtain a draw of θ  from the 
conditional distribution function ( )F θ ω . Whereas the distribution function ( )G ω  is unrestricted, 
apart from the standard monotonicity and continuity properties, the analytical results that we present 
rely on postulating that ( )F θ ω  is a uniform distribution. In particular, the density function of this 
distribution is: 
                                                          
2 Linearity of the marginal cost schedule is the main assumption in (2). Conditional on that, setting 
the slope equal to one is achieved without further loss of generality by choice of the units of 
measurement for Q .  
1c
2 2
2
( ,0)C Q
Q
∂
∂
2c
2c θ−
2 2
2
( , )C Q
Q
θ∂
∂
Q
( )P Q
1 1
1
( )C Q
Q
∂
∂
p
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 [ ]if 
otherwise
1 0,
( )
0
f
ω θ ω
θ ω
∈
= 

   (3) 
The parameter ω  characterizes technological opportunity, such that the expected value and upper 
bound of the innovation draw θ  are increasing in ω .  But because even the most promising 
innovation can fail, the lower bound on innovation quality is always zero. We assume that ω  is 
private information known to innovators, but that the functions ( )G ω  and ( )F θ ω  are common 
knowledge. 
Innovation is understood as producing know-how, and this knowledge is patentable. Innovators 
produce a blueprint for a new technology, and can license these blueprints to the competitive 
production sector that produces renewable energy. Licensing is presumed to take the forms of a 
fixed royalty rate r  per unit of 2Q . In this setting, we want to evaluate the effectiveness of mandates 
as a policy tool to both ameliorate the externality and promote innovation. For a meaningful 
benchmark, we compare mandates with a carbon tax and, naturally, both policies with the laissez faire 
situation without any policy. For clarity, we start with the latter cases. 
2.1 Innovation under laissez faire 
For the characterization of both the laissez faire situation (absence of government policy), and the 
case of a carbon tax considered next, the inverse residual demand curve facing clean the production 
sector can be written as:  
 ( )
− + ≤ += 

if 
otherwise
1
1 2 1
2 2
( )
( )
c t Q P c tP Q
P Q
   (4) 
where t  denotes the carbon (per unit of dirty energy). For the laissez faire case of this section, 0t = . 
In such a case, if clean energy is priced below the cost of dirty energy ( 1c ), then it captures the entire 
market; if it is priced above the cost of dirty energy, demand for clean energy falls to zero; and, any 
quantity − ∈  
1
2 10, ( )Q P c  can be sold when clean energy is priced at the cost of dirty energy.  
As noted earlier, the realistic scenario is that the new renewable energy source does not completely 
replace the pre-existing conventional source. That is, the innovation is “nondrastic” in Arrow’s 
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(1962) terminology. The following condition, which we maintain throughout (unless otherwise 
stated), will guarantee this outcome.  
Condition 1. The upper bound on technological innovation satisfies 12 1 1( )c c P cω −≤ − + .  
In this section we assume that there is only one firm capable of innovating (this assumption is 
relaxed in later sections). To characterize the innovator’s decision problem, consider first the 
licensing stage for an arbitrary innovation of quality θ . The innovator sets the per-unit royalty r  to 
maximizes profits, conditional on the adoption constraint by the competitive clean production 
sector (which, given the foregoing considerations, faces a perfectly elastic demand at price equal to 
1c ). Thus, the innovator’s optimal royalty maximizes 2rQ , where the demand from the competitive 
adopting clean energy sector, for 2 0Q > , satisfies 2 2 1c Q r cθ− + + = . When 2 1c cθ− ≥  there is no 
strictly positive license fee that can result in any adoption. In such a case, the innovation is 
insufficient to be cost-competitive with the dirty technology. Thus, licensing only occurs if the 
innovative step is sufficiently large. More specifically, 2 1ˆ c cθ ≡ −  defines the minimum innovative 
step beyond which the innovation becomes profitable. For ˆθ θ≥ , optimal royalty is ˆ* ( ) 2r θ θ= − , 
and at this price the quantity licensed is 2 ˆ( ) 2Q θ θ= − .  The maximum profit an innovator with 
technology θ  can obtain, when ˆθ θ≥ , is 2ˆ( ) 2π θ θ= −  (and, of course, 0π =  when ˆθ θ< ). 
A researcher with technological opportunity ω  expects the innovation to yield zero profit whenever 
ˆθ θ< , which happens with probability θˆ ω , and thus to make positive profit with probability 
ˆ1 θ ω− .  Expected profit conditional on ω , denoted ( )π ω , can therefore be written as: 
 ( )
3
2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ1 ( )ˆ1 ( )ˆ 124( )
d
ω
θ
θ ω θ
π ω θ θ θ
ω ωω θ
    −
= − − =   
−  
∫   (5) 
Because the innovator is assumed to be risk neutral, she will choose to conduct research whenever 
the expected profits from licensing exceed the costs of R&D, which occurs when ( ) kπ ω ≥ . This 
implies the existence of a threshold ˆωˆ θ> , which satisfies ˆ( ) kπ ω = , such that innovation is 
undertaken if and only if ˆω ω> .  
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To understand how innovation affects welfare we note that, given the presumption that innovation 
is non-drastic, renewable energy is always priced at 1c  (when developed). This means that the total 
quantity of energy Q  , and consumer surplus (denoted 0S ), are not affected by innovation. Instead, 
innovation affects the share of energy produced by renewable sources, and reduces the status quo ante 
damage from externalities (denoted 0X ) by 2xQ . Recall that, when there is innovation, 
2
ˆ( ) 2Q θ θ= − , and thus [ ] ω θ= −2 ˆ( 2 ) 4E Q . License revenues are given in equation (5). Clean 
producer profits can be shown to be 3ˆ( ) 24ω θ ω−  in expectation. All told, therefore, expected 
welfare in the absence of government intervention is 
 [ ] ( )ω
ω
ω θ ω θ ω θ
ω
ω ω
   − − − = − + + + −   
     
∫
3 3
0 0 ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 2
12 24 4
E W S X x k dG   (6) 
where the third term in the RHS of (6) is the expected contribution of innovation to welfare.  
2.2 The naïve carbon tax 
It is well known that laissez-faire expected welfare, in this setting, is suboptimal for two reasons: the 
uncompensated negative externality means there is excess production of dirty fuel, relative to the 
social optimum; and, the extent of innovation is insufficient. The canonical solution to an externality 
of the type posited is a carbon tax on the dirty fuel. Because use of fossil fuels incurs a social cost x  
per unit consumed, if we ignore the prospect of innovation the tax should be set at t x= . We will 
use this “naïve” carbon tax as the benchmark in our analytical results, and consider the optimal 
carbon tax (which also accounts for the prospect of innovation) in the numerical section. With a unit 
tax t  on fossil fuel, clean producers face an inverse residual demand curve given in (4). As illustrated 
in the previous section, some innovations may be of insufficient size to be competitive, so that the 
characterization of the impact of innovation needs to always account for the probability that an 
innovation of sufficient size actually materializes. To simplify the exposition, and without much loss 
of generality, it is convenient to maintain the following condition. 
Condition 2. The pre-innovation renewable energy technology satisfies 2 1c c x= + . 
This parametric case restricts attention to the situation where the renewable energy source is on the 
brink of being competitive, given an appropriately tax on the externality posed by the dirty 
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technology. Condition 2 guarantees that the optimal supply of renewable energy is positive for any 
0θ >  (i.e., the subsequent analysis can drop the parameter θˆ  corresponding to the minimum 
inventive step).  
Given Condition 2, the optimal license fee and equilibrium quantity of renewable energy satisfy 
2* 2r Q θ= = . The maximum profit for an innovator possessing an innovation of quality θ , given 
the existence of the carbon tax t , is: 2 4tπ θ= . The innovator’s expected profits conditional on 
technological opportunity, denoted ( )tπ ω , is given by: 
 ( )
2
12t
ω
π ω =    (7) 
Given the existence of a tax t , the threshold ˆtω  for R&D to be conducted satisfies ˆ( )t t kπ ω = , and 
thus ˆ 12t kω = . It is readily verified that this threshold is lower than under laissez-faire, i.e., ˆ ˆtω ω< .  
Similarly to the laissez-faire situation, with a carbon tax a non-drastic innovation does not affect the 
total quantity of energy nor consumer surplus (here denoted *0S ). Innovation now improves welfare 
through its effect on the cost of producing clean fuel, via license profit to the innovator and 
producer surplus to clean producers. The former was derived in (7). The producer surplus of clean 
producers can be shown to be 2 8θ , or 2 24ω  in expectation. Combining all elements, expected 
welfare with innovation, given the carbon tax t x= , is: 
 [ ] ( )
2 2
*
0 ˆ 12 24t
E W S k dG
ω
ω
ω ω
ω
 
= + + − 
 
∫    (8) 
When compared with (6) we note that the term related to the environmental externality is absent. 
But welfare is still suboptimal because of the standard appropriability problem that is only partially 
solved by patents (innovation in underprovided from a social point of view). 
2.3 Mandates 
A mandate policy specifies a minimum amount a renewable energy to be used as part of the 
production/consumption portfolio. Such a policy can be modeled either as a proportional or an 
absolute mandates. With an absolute mandate, distributors must ensure that 2 ˆQ Q≥ , where Qˆ  is 
12 
 
the mandated minimum quantity of total renewable energy in use. With a proportional mandate, 
distributors are required to ensure that the total quantity of renewable energy 2Q  amounts to (at 
least) a given proportion of the total energy 1 2Q Q Q≡ +  (e.g., 10 percent). Which of these two 
modeling approaches are employed does not matter for some questions (e.g., de Gorter and Just 
2009, Lapan and Moschini 2012).3 In our innovation context, which of these two approaches one 
uses does entail some modeling differences. Whereas the substantive conclusions one reaches are 
not affected by this choice, it turns out that an absolute mandate permits a crisper analysis (because 
it is easier to formalize the results without specifying a particular form for the aggregate energy 
inverse demand function ( )P Q ). Hence, we proceed by explicitly modeling an absolute mandate. 
The implementation of the mandate postulates the existence of a competitive blending sector that 
combines energy from two sources: conventional energy, sourced at the constant marginal cost 1c , 
and renewable energy, priced at its (increasing) marginal cost 2 2 2 2C Q c r Qθ∂ ∂ = − + + . The zero 
profit condition for the competitive blending sector ensures that, for a given mandate Qˆ  of 
renewable energy and corresponding quantity ˆ( )Q Q−  of conventional energy, consumers are 
charged a price ( )P Q  that is the weighted average of the energy input costs: 
( )1 2
ˆ ˆˆ( ) Q Q QP Q c c r Q
Q Q
θ
−
≡ + − + +                                                                                 (9) 
This formulation presumes that the mandate is binding (typically the case of interest), which is the 
case whenever the mandate Qˆ  is such that 2 1ˆ( )c r Q cθ− + + > . The issue of feasibility of the 
mandate should be noted at this juncture. Feasibility is relevant because how much consumers are 
willing to buy at the blend price is still governed by the (inverse) demand function ( )P Q . Because 
consumers (and competitive suppliers) cannot be coerced, not every arbitrary mandate Qˆ  is feasible. 
Therefore, in what follows we will assume that the mandate is feasible.  
                                                          
3 US biofuel mandates can be rationalized as either absolute or proportional mandates. In particular, 
the EISA legislation specifies absolute mandates for various biofuels. The implementation of such 
mandates, however, takes the form of proportional mandates imposed on obligated parties. These 
proportional mandates are set annually by the EPA so that the statutory absolute mandates specified 
by EISA are met, given the prevailing demand conditions (Schnepf and Yacobucci 2013). 
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Condition 3. The mandate is feasible in that there is an equilibrium total quantity that solves 
( *) ( *)P Q P Q=  and satisfies ˆ*Q Q≥ . 
Figure 2 illustrates the case of a feasible mandate (Qˆ′ ) and that of an unfeasible mandate (Qˆ′′ ). If 
we define Q  such that 2 2(Q,0) ( )C Q P Q∂ ∂ = , then a sufficient condition to ensure feasibility of the 
mandate is that Qˆ Q≤ . This requirement is not necessary, however. For a fixed Qˆ , and given that 
2 1
ˆc Q c+ > , the blend price ( )P Q  is decreasing in Q  and asymptotically approaches 1c  from above 
as Q  increases. So, it is quite possible for the equilibrium condition ( *) ( *)P Q P Q=  to be satisfied 
with ˆ*Q Q≥  for some Qˆ Q> .4  
Figure 2. Feasible and unfeasible mandates 
 
                                                          
4 When the mandate exceeds Q  there may be multiple solutions to ( *) ( *)P Q P Q=  (in which case 
one may appeal to stability conditions to select the relevant equilibrium) or none at all, depending on 
the shape of the market inverse demand function ( )P Q . 
1c
2c
Q
( )P Q
p
ˆ( )P Q Q′
Qˆ′ Qˆ′′
2 2
2
( ,0)C Q
Q
∂
∂
ˆ( )P Q Q′′
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For the analytical results that follow, we wish to concentrate on the policy-relevant case when, post-
innovation, the mandate is binding (we will relax this assumption in the numerical analysis of Section 
6). In such a case, an innovating firm in possession of technology θ  chooses the royalty rate to 
maximize ˆrQ , such that 2 2ˆ ˆc Q r c Qθ− + + ≤ + . This constraint represents the option that clean 
producers have to meet the mandate by using the pre-innovation technology (for which 0θ = ). 
Clearly, the profit-maximizing license is *r θ= . The profit attainable by an innovator with 
technology θ , under a binding mandate, is therefore ˆm Qπ θ= . What parametric conditions would 
ensure that the mandate is binding? When the best possible technology is such that 2 1ˆ c cω θ≤ ≡ − , 
then obviously the mandate is always binding. Otherwise, we note that for the innovator to exceed 
the mandate the new technology would need to be priced to be competitive with the dirty 
technology, which is available at marginal cost 1c .  From the laissez-faire section 2.1, the profit of the 
innovator with such a pricing strategy is 2ˆ( ) 2π θ θ= − . If this profit, for the best possible 
innovation θ ω= , is no larger than mπ  given above, then the mandate will be binding. Hence, when 
2 1c cω > − , to guarantee that the mandate is always binding it suffices to assume:  
 Condition 4. The mandate satisfies ( )22 1ˆ ( ) 4Q c cω ω≥ − −  and thus is always binding. 
Given that the mandate is binding, the expected profit of the innovator with technological 
opportunity ω , denotes ( )mπ ω , is: 
 ˆ( ) 2m Qπ ω ω=    (10) 
The lower bound for technological opportunity under which innovation occurs, denoted ˆmω , solves
ˆ( )m m kπ ω = , and therefore ˆˆ 2m k Qω = . This threshold is increasing in the cost of R&D and 
decreasing in the mandate.  Under a mandate policy, therefore, R&D occurs with probability 
ˆ1 ( )mG ω− . Moreover, by Condition 4, ω ω≤ˆ ˆm , so that the probability of R&D is higher under a 
mandate than the laissez-faire case. 
Concerning the impact of innovation on welfare we again find that, because neither the price nor 
quantity of energy produced changes, there is no change in consumer surplus, now denoted 0mS , nor 
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the damage from the externality, denoted 0mX . In this case, the producer surplus 0mΠ  of clean firms 
is also unaffected by innovation, because the innovator fully appropriates the reduction in cost 
brought about by the innovation. Accordingly, the change in welfare due to innovation is purely 
derived from licensing profits less R&D costs, so that expected welfare under a mandate is given by: 
 [ ] 0 0 0 ˆ
ˆ
( )
2m
m m m QE W S X k dG
ω
ω
ω
ω
 
= + Π − + − 
 
∫   (11) 
While the static welfare 0 0 0m m mS X+ Π −  may be suboptimal, the extent of induced innovation, given 
this policy, is optimal, because the threshold ˆmω  is exactly determined by where the term under the 
integral is equal to zero.  Moreover, equation (11) implies: 
RESULT 1. The welfare maximizing quantity mandate is increased when the social planner 
takes into account its impact on innovation. 
To see why this is the case, consider the case where innovation is not possible. In this case, the 
optimal static mandate 0Qˆ  is chosen so that: 
 0 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )
0ˆ ˆ ˆ
m m mS X
Q Q Q
− + −
∂ ∂Π ∂
+ − =
∂ ∂ ∂
   (12) 
where the sign of the derivative is given below each term. This first order condition pins down the 
optimal mandate in the absence of innovation (assuming the usual concavity conditions are 
satisfied). However, incorporating innovation changes the first order condition such that the optimal 
mandate, denoted 0ˆ IQ , now solves: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0
0 ˆ
ˆ ˆˆ( ) 0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 2m
m m m
mI S X QZ Q dG k
Q Q Q Q
ω
ω
ωω ω
ω
+− + − −+
 ∂ ∂Π ∂ ∂
≡ + − + − − = 
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∫   (13) 
It is apparent that, when evaluated at 0Qˆ , 0ˆ( ) 0Z Q > . This implies that welfare, when evaluated at 
0Qˆ , is increasing in Qˆ , so that the mandate should be increased relative to the optimal mandate 
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without innovation. The intuition here is that innovation increases welfare, and a larger mandate 
increases the incentive to innovate. 
3. Mandate vs. Carbon Tax: A Comparison 
To evaluate the effectiveness of mandates vis-à-vis the alternative of a carbon tax, it is necessary that 
the two policies be calibrated to make the comparison meaningful. The benchmark we select initially 
is to require that the two policies yield the same probability that R&D be undertaken by the 
innovator, which requires that thresholds of technological opportunity be the same under the two 
policies, i.e., ˆ ˆt mω ω= . The threshold under a carbon tax t x=  that fully internalizes the social cost 
of conventional energy, given Condition 2, was shown to be ˆ 12t kω = , whereas under a mandate 
the innovation threshold is ˆˆ 2m k Qω = . Hence, the comparable mandate is ˆ / 3Q k= . 
Remark 1.  When the mandate Qˆ  is calibrated to yield the same probability of R&D as the 
carbon tax, the expected value of the technology used by clean producers is the same under 
both policies.  
This observation simply follows from the fact Condition 2 entails that, ex post, all technologies are 
used by clean producers, under either taxes or mandates, for any ˆ ˆt mω ω ω≥ = .  
Moreover, we also note the following feature of mandates. 
Remark 2.  As the cost of R&D increases, the level of the mandate must be progressively 
increased in order to attain the same probability of R&D as a fixed carbon tax. 
Whereas the above remarks show that each policy is capable of inducing innovation at the same rate, 
the welfare implications of these policies differ. 
RESULT 2. When a mandate is chosen so that R&D is equally probable under a mandate or 
a carbon tax, then expected welfare is higher with a carbon tax. 
The proof of this result starts by noting that Result 2 will hold so long as: 
 ( ) ( )
2 2
*
0 0 0 0ˆ ˆ
ˆ
12 24 2t m
m m m QS k dG S X k dG
ω ω
ω ω
ω ω ω
ω ω
   
+ + − ≥ + Π − + −   
  
∫ ∫   (14) 
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We note at this juncture that a mandate ˆ 0Q >  is incapable of achieving the first best allocation in 
the absence of innovation. Given the parameterization of Condition 2, the optimal allocation in the 
absence of innovation has 1 1( )P Q c x= +  and 2 0Q = . This mix of energy inputs is impossible to 
achieve with an instrument that only requires 2 ˆQ Q≥ . Because the first-best allocation (absent 
innovation) is attained by a carbon tax, it must be that *0 0 0 0m m mS S X> + Π − . Hence, Result 2 will 
hold when the gains from innovation under the carbon tax exceed those under the mandate, i.e.,  
 ( ) ( )
2 2
ˆ ˆ
/ 3
12 24 2t t
kk dG k dG
ω ω
ω ω
ω ω ω
ω ω
   
+ − ≥ −   
  
∫ ∫   (15) 
where we have exploited the fact that the mandate is calibrated so that ˆ ˆm tω ω= , so that the integrals 
in (14) have the same bounds. A sufficient condition for equation (15) to hold is that the integrand 
in the LHS exceed the integrand in the RHS for each ω . It is verified that the required condition is  
 [ ]ˆ4 / 3 , ,tkω ω ω ω≥ ∀ ∈    (16) 
Because this condition is satisfied for the lower bound ˆ 12t kω = , and the LHS in (16) is increasing 
in ω , the condition is always satisfied. 
Given the foregoing, Result 2 continues to hold when the mandate is calibrated so that the 
probability of R&D is lower than under a carbon tax. However, when mandates are chosen so that 
the probability of R&D is higher than under the carbon tax t x= , then it is not apparent whether or 
not a mandate has lower expected welfare than a carbon tax. In such a case, the gain to welfare from 
inducing more innovation would need to be weighed against the costs of R&D and distortions to 
static welfare. We will return to this question in the numerical analysis of Section 6.  
4. Multiple innovators 
The preceding discussion pertains to the case of a single research firm. In reality, of course, many 
innovators are typically engaged in competing R&D projects. To model this case, we postulate the 
existence of a large number of potential innovators, and we assume there is free entry into the 
renewable energy innovation sector. Innovators are ex ante identical and observe a common 
technological opportunity signal ω . If they choose to conduct R&D, they obtain independent θ  
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draws from ( )f θ ω . The innovator who draws the highest θ , denoted 1θ , has the best technology 
and becomes the exclusive licensor to the renewable energy production sector. However, the choice 
of royalty by the innovator who draws 1θ  is now constrained by the presence of competing 
innovators. Under Bertrand competition, the second-highest θ  draw, denoted 2θ , is the binding 
constraint. Essentially, as compared with the foregoing analysis, 2θ  plays the same role as the pre-
innovation production technique 0θ =  for the single innovator case. But, of course, in the multiple 
innovator setting 2θ  is endogenous.  
To characterize the pricing of innovation with multiple innovators, consider first the laissez faire 
setting. The innovator with the ex post best technology 1θ , presuming that 1 2 1ˆ c cθ θ> ≡ − , sets the 
per-unit license r  to maximize license profit, conditional on the competitive sector adoption, similar 
to the single-innovator setting. But here the second best technology 2θ  may limit the price that the 
licensing innovator can extract. Specifically, the innovator with the best technology maximizes 
( )1 2 1r c c rθ− + − , such that 1 2r θ θ≤ − . For low realizations of 2θ , the constraint imposed by the 
second-best technology does not bind, the single-innovator results continue to hold, and the 
solution is 2 1 ˆ* ( ) 2r Q θ θ= = − . Given this unconstrained royalty, it is apparent that the constraint 
1 2r θ θ≤ − binds whenever 2 1 ˆ( ) 2θ θ θ> + . In such a case the optimal royalty is 1 2*r θ θ= − , and 
2 2
ˆQ θ θ= − . The best innovator’s maximum profit, denoted 1π , is therefore given by: 
   if 
2
1
1 2 1
ˆ( ) ˆ( ) 2
4
θ θ
π θ θ θ
−
= ≤ +   (17) 
 ( ) ( )  if 1 1 2 2 2 1ˆ ˆ( ) 2π θ θ θ θ θ θ θ= − − > +   (18) 
The expected profit of a potential entrant now depends on the distribution of 1θ  and 2θ , which are 
best described by the concepts of “order statistics” widely used in auction theory (Krishna 2010). 
Specifically, given n  innovators, the probability that an innovator’s draw of θ  is the maximum 
draw is equal to the probability that the 1n −  other draws are smaller than θ . Because we have 
assumed a uniform distribution for the innovation projects, then 
 ( ) ( ) 11Pr ,
nnθ θ ω θ ω −= =    (19) 
19 
 
Moreover, conditional on a given θ  being the maximum draw, the second highest realization 2θ  is 
the maximum of 1n −  independent draws from the uniform distribution on the support of [ ]0,θ . 
This is described by the cumulative distribution function: 
 ( ) ( ) 12 2Pr ,
nnθ θ ω θ θ −< =   (20) 
which implies that the density function of 2θ  is ( ) ( )
1
2 2( 1)
nn θ θ θ −− .  Using these results on the 
distribution of the first and second best innovations, we can determine the expected profitability of 
participating in the R&D contest. Specifically, with n  entrants, the expected profit of each 
innovator, given technological opportunity ω , can be written as: 
1 1 12
2
2 2 2ˆ ˆ( ) 2 2
ˆ ˆ( ) 1 1ˆ( , ) ( )( )
2 4
n n nnn d d
ω θ
θ θ θ
θθ θ θ θ θ
π ω θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ ω ω
− − −
+
  + − −    = + − −           
∫ ∫      (21) 
This term integrates over the range of values for θ  that are both feasible and which earn positive 
profit. Within the integral, profits are divided into two terms. When 2 ˆ( ) 2θ θ θ≤ + , which occurs 
with probability 
1ˆ( ) 2
n
θ θ θ
−
 +  , profit is given by equation (17). This is the first term under the 
integral. Conversely, whenever 2 1 ˆ( ) 2θ θ θ> + , profit is given by equation (18). This is captured by 
the second term, itself an integral over possible values of 2θ . 
4.1 Free Entry of Innovators Under a Carbon Tax 
With the naïve carbon tax t x= , the innovator’s problem is similar in structure to the laissez faire 
setting. But here, if the pre-innovation technology is such that Condition 2 applies, it is as if ˆ 0θ = . 
Hence, given 1θ  and 2θ , the best innovator’s profit is: 
 ( )
( )
 if 
 if 
2
1 2 1
1 2 2 2 1
2 / 2
/ 2t
θ θ θπ
θ θ θ θ θ
 ≤= 
− >
   (22) 
Given this conditional profit function, equation (21) can be adapted to yield the expected profit 
( ),t nπ ω  of each innovator facing technological opportunity ω  when there are n  innovators 
engaged in R&D:  
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 ( ) ( )1
1
2 1 11
1 2 1
1 2 2 2 10 /2 2 1
1 1 1,
2 2
n nn
t
nn d d
ω θ
θ
θ θ θ
π ω θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ ω ω
− −− −       = + −                 
∫ ∫   (23) 
Performing the integration, and simplifying, yields: 
 ( )
( )
( ) ( )
2
1 (1 2)
,
1 2
n
t
n
n
n n n
π ω ω
− −
=
+ +
   (24) 
Note that when 1n =  equation (24) reduces to 2 12ω , which is what we found the single innovator 
profit to be in section 3.2. Profit is clearly increasing in technological opportunity ω . It is also 
verified that profit is decreasing in the number of innovators n  (this occurs for two distinct reasons: 
as n  increases, the probability of any one participant drawing the highest innovations decreases; 
and, as n  increases, the expected royalty for any given innovation decreases).   
The equilibrium number of innovators is determined by the free entry condition. In equilibrium, 
noting that n  is an integer, the number of innovators *tn  satisfies: 
 ( ) ( )* *, , 1t t t tn k nπ ω π ω≥ ≥ +    (25) 
To emphasize the dependence of the equilibrium number of firms on the R&D outlook parameter 
ω , which represents the asymmetric information between innovators and policy makers, in what 
follows this is denoted * ( )t tn n ω= .  
In section 3.2 we found there existed a unique threshold ˆtω , where R&D occurred whenever 
ˆtω ω≥ . With free entry, an analogous result can be stated as follows.  
Remark 3. Equilibrium with free R&D entry and a carbon tax implies the existence of a 
sequence of thresholds ˆ ( )t nω  such that there are at least n  active innovators iff ˆ ( )t nω ω≥ . 
The threshold levels ˆ ( )t nω  are readily computed from (24) and (25): 
 ( 1)( 2)ˆ ( )
1 (1 2)t n
n n nn k
n
ω
+ +
=
− +
   (26) 
21 
 
A corollary is that, under free entry, some R&D will take place whenever it is an equilibrium 
outcome to have at least one innovator, i.e., ˆ (1)tω ω≥ , which occurs when 12kω ≥ . Naturally, 
this is the same condition as in the single-innovator case. 
As in the single innovator case, consumer surplus is not impacted by innovation, since the price and 
quantity of final energy is unchanged. Hence, innovation only affects welfare through the profit 
accruing to the winning innovator and the producer surplus of clean producers—denoted 
( )* , ( )t tnπ ω ω  and ( ), ( )t tnω ωΠ , respectively—and total R&D costs ( )tn kω . Expected welfare can 
be expressed as: 
 [ ] ( ) ( ){ }* *0 0 , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t tE W S n n n k dG
ω
π ω ω ω ω ω ω= + + Π −∫   (27) 
4.2 Free Entry of Innovators Under a Mandate 
Under a quota mandate, distributors must ensure 2 ˆQ Q≥ . The problem faced by an innovator is 
the same as in section 2.3, but, because of the presumption of Bertrand competition, with the 
binding constraint now given by the second best technology, where 2 0θ ≥ . This constraint imposes 
more limitations on the choice of royalty. Specifically, Condition 4 invoked earlier for the single 
innovator case may no longer suffice to guarantee that the mandate binds. Instead, whenever 
 2 2 1ˆc Q cθ− + <    (28) 
then the second-best technology is sufficiently good that clean firms would want to use it and 
exceed the mandate if this technology were competitively priced. The best technology, of course, 
pre-empts adoption of the second-best technology, but the winning innovator must choose the 
royalty rate as in the laissez-faire setting discussed earlier, in this case leading to an adoption level that 
exceeds the mandate.  The best possible θ2  is ω  and so we assume: 
Condition 5. The mandate is large enough to always bind, i.e., ( )ω≥ − −2 1Qˆ c c . 
This condition is stronger than Condition 4. Note that the best possible θ1  is also ω  and so 
Condition 5 ensures that the winning innovator cannot choose a royalty such that the mandate is 
exceeded. 
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If Condition 5 does not hold, then there will be cases where the winning innovator exceeds the 
mandate and competes with the fossil fuel alternative as in the laissez-faire case. The resulting profits, 
however, are lower than if fossil fuels were subjected to a carbon tax. Therefore, any draws of θ1  
and θ2  that lead the winning firm to exceed Qˆ  are valued less under a mandate than they would be 
under a carbon tax, and this reduces the incentive to invest in R&D when such draws are possible. 
Hence, in the analytical derivations that follow we continue to assume that Qˆ  and ω  are such that 
the mandate is always binding in the post-innovation situation (which provide the best possible set 
of conditions for the effectiveness of a mandate vis-à-vis the carbon tax). We will return to the 
possibility that the mandate does not bind in the numerical simulations reported in Section 6.  
Given a binding mandate, an innovating firm in possession of the best technology 1θ  chooses the 
royalty rate to maximize ˆrQ , such that 2 1 2 2ˆ ˆc Q r c Qθ θ− + + ≤ − + . The latter indicates the 
constraint that marginal costs using the best technology, while paying a royalty r , must not exceed 
marginal costs using the second best technology with a royalty of zero. Clearly, the optimal royalty is 
1 2*r θ θ= −  and the quantity induced is Qˆ .  Therefore, the profit of an innovator with the best 
technology 1θ , facing the second best technology 2θ , is: 
 ( )1 2 ˆm Qπ θ θ= −    (29) 
Using the probabilities given by equations (19) and (20), the expected profit of each entrant in the 
R&D contest, given n  innovators and technological opportunity ω , is: 
 ( ) ( )1
1 1
2 1
1 2 2 10 0 2 1
1 1ˆ,
n n
m
nn Qd d
ω θ θ θ
π ω θ θ θ θ
θ θ ω ω
− − −     = −    
     
∫ ∫   (30) 
After integrating and simplifying, we obtain: 
 ( ) ( )
ˆ
,
1m
Qn
n n
π ω ω=
+
   (31) 
Expected profit is increasing in technological opportunity ω  and the mandate Qˆ , and decreasing in 
the number of innovators. The equilibrium number of innovators * ( )m mn n ω=  satisfies: 
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 ( ) ( )* *, , 1m m m mn k nπ ω π ω≥ ≥ +    (32) 
Remark 4. Equilibrium with free R&D entry and a mandate policy implies the existence of a 
series of thresholds ˆ ( )m nω  such that there are at least n  active innovators iff ˆ ( )m nω ω≥ . 
These threshold levels ˆ ( )m nω  are computed from (31) and (32): 
 ( ) ( 1)ˆ ˆm
n nn k
Q
ω
+
=    (33) 
Under free entry, there will be some R&D whenever ˆ (1)mω ω≥ , or ˆ2k Qω ≥ . Naturally, this is the 
same condition found in section 3.3 for the single innovator case. 
Expected welfare under a mandate is no longer straightforward in the presence of multiple 
innovators. A major difference is that, in the single innovator case, the innovating firm appropriated 
all of the gains from innovation, so that the price of clean fuel was unchanged by innovation. Under 
free entry, on the other hand, the winning innovator is only able to appropriate the gains to 
innovation stemming from improvements over the second best innovation. This also means that the 
price of clean fuel falls by 2θ  which, because the price consumers pay for energy under a mandate is 
given by  ( )P Q  in equation (9), leads to an expansion of demand and to a new equilibrium Q′  
satisfying ( ) ( )P Q P Q′ ′= , where 0Q Q′ >  and 0Q  is the pre-innovation equilibrium with mandates. 
Given a binding mandate, this demand expansion is met entirely by increased dirty fuel production. 
Whereas the price decline due to the innovation raises consumer surplus, it also increases damages 
from externalities by 0( )Q Q x′ − . The increase in damage from the externality exceeds the gain in 
consumer surplus whenever: 
 0
0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q
Q
Q Q x P q dq P Q Q P Q Q
′
′ ′ ′− > − +∫   (34) 
This condition can be rewritten as: 
 ( )[ ] ( )0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )QQ x P q P Q dq P Q P Q Q
′
′ ′− − > −∫   (35) 
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The right side of equation (35) is always positive, and so this equation can never be satisfied when 
( )0( ) ( )x P Q P Q′< − , i.e., when the change in price is greater than marginal damage. Equation (35) is 
most likely to hold when demand is highly elastic, so that Q′  is much larger than 0Q  but the change 
in price is small relative to marginal damage.  
RESULT 3. Under a mandate, the positive welfare impact of innovation is reduced by an 
expansion of dirty energy consumption. This effect is more sizeable when demand is sufficiently 
elastic and marginal damage is sufficiently high. 
This result establishes that innovation under a mandate is susceptible to a form of the so-called 
rebound effect. A mandate acts like a tax on the consumption of dirty energy because the use of 
expensive renewable energy raises the overall cost of energy. But as innovation reduces the cost of 
renewable energy, the cost of all energy also falls. The increase in total demand is then entirely met 
by dirty fuel when, as in the case being analyzed, the mandate remains binding.   
Under free entry, consumer surplus, clean producer profits, and externalities all depend on the 
second-best technology, and through this channel their expected values depend on ω . Overall 
welfare is now written as:  
 [ ] ( ){ }*0 , ( ) ( ) ( )m m m m m mE W E S E E X n n k dG
ω
ω ω ω π ω ω ω ω     = + Π − + −     ∫   (36) 
5. Mandate vs. Carbon Tax with Multiple Innovators 
With multiple innovators and free entry in the R&D contest, the choice between a carbon tax and a 
mandate has a greater impact on the character of the realized innovation. To begin, it is more likely 
there will be at least n  innovators under a carbon tax than under a mandate whenever 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )m tn nω ω≥ . By using equations (26) and (33), and simplifying, this condition reduces to: 
 
( )2
2
ˆ 1 (1 2) ( 1)n
k n
Q n n n
+
≥
− + +
   (37) 
For any given policy the left hand side is fixed, while the right hand side is decreasing in n . This 
suggests there is a threshold nˆ  such that at least n  innovators are more likely under a carbon tax 
whenever ˆn n> , where nˆ  is defined by: 
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  (38) 
Because ˆ ˆ( ) ( )m tn nω ω≥  for all ˆn n≥ , and given that ˆ ( )m nω  and ˆ ( )t nω  are monotonically increasing 
in n , we conclude with the following result.  
RESULT 4. Whenever technological opportunity exceeds a threshold, i.e., ˆˆ ( )t nω ω≥ , the 
number of innovators is (weakly) higher under a carbon tax than under a mandate. 
Conversely, whenever ˆˆ ( )t nω ω≤ , the number of innovators is (weakly) higher under a 
mandate policy than a carbon tax. 
Under either policy, the realized innovation is the best technology drawn by any of the innovators, 
denoted 1θ . Conditional on the technology opportunity parameter ω  and the number of innovators 
n , the expected new technology is 
  [ ] ( )1 10, ,E n f n d
ω
θ ω θ θ ω θ= ∫            (39) 
where ( )1 ,f nθ ω  here is the density function of the distribution of the highest order statistics, 
which can be related to the primitive distribution ( )f θ ω  (Krishna 2010). Because of our assumed 
uniform distribution ( )f θ ω θ ω= , it follows that  
( )
1
1
1,
n
f n n θθ ω
ω ω
−
 =  
 
            (40) 
Using this density function and performing the integration in (39) we find:  
[ ]1 , 1
nE n
n
θ ω ω=
+
             (41) 
Of course, as discussed in the foregoing, the equilibrium number of innovators will depend on the 
actual technology opportunity ω  and on the policy in place, i.e., ( ) , ,in n i t mω= = . Furthermore, 
from the perspective of a social planner (who does not observe ω ), what is relevant is the 
unconditional expectation of the best technology, that is  
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ω
=
+∫    (42) 
This makes it apparent that, given the primitive distribution of technological opportunities ( )G ω , 
the expected technology realized depends only on the number of innovators induced by the policy 
,i t m=  for every opportunity ω . 
In section 2.4 we showed that, for the single innovator case, setting a mandate equal to ˆ / 3Q k=  
ensures that R&D occurs under either policy with equal probability. Using the same policy under 
free entry preserves this property, but Result 2—according to which the expected technology in use 
is the same under either policy—is no longer true. When ˆ / 3Q k= , then equation (38) is satisfied 
by ˆ 1n =  and ( ) ( )t mn nω ω≥  for all ω . By equation (42) this implies the expected technology in use 
will be higher under a carbon tax. 
RESULT 5. When the mandate is tuned so that the probability of R&D under a mandate is 
equal to the probability of R&D under a carbon tax, then the expected technology realized 
after innovation is better under a carbon tax. 
What if the mandate Qˆ  were tuned so that the expected best technology is the same as under the 
carbon tax?  In order for [ ]1E θ  to be the same under either policy, the mandate must be increased 
from / 3k , so that ˆ ( )m nω  is decreased. Because ( ) ˆˆ ( ) 1m n n n k Qω = + , increasing Qˆ  will decrease 
ˆ ( )m nω  for all n . Specifically, we will now have ˆ ˆ(1) (1)m tω ω<  so that R&D is more likely to occur 
under a mandate than under a carbon tax. Moreover, for [ ]1E θ  to be the same under either policy, 
it cannot be that ( ) ( )m tn nω ω> , where ( )in ω  is the number of innovators under policy i  and the 
best possible technological opportunity. If this were the case, then by Result 4, ( ) ( )m tn nω ω>  for all 
[ ]0,ω ω∈  and by equation (42) [ ]1E θ  would be higher under a mandate. Therefore, in this setting, 
there is some intermediate threshold nˆ , satisfying ˆ1 ( )mn n ω< < , where the number of innovators is 
higher under a carbon tax for ˆˆ ( )t nω ω≥  and higher under a mandate otherwise. This implies: 
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RESULT 6. When the mandate is tuned so that the expected best technology is the same 
under either policy, then the distribution of outcomes under a carbon tax is more disperse 
than under a mandate.  
This result asserts that under a carbon tax there is a higher probability of a very good innovation or 
none at all. A mandate has a higher probability of some innovation, but a lower probability of a very 
good innovation, since it produces weaker incentives to innovate when technological opportunity is 
very high. 
6. Numerical Analysis 
The foregoing analysis has provided some interesting qualitative results on the comparison between 
mandates, laissez-faire and a carbon tax. While these results are illuminating, a limitation is that, apart 
from Result 2, not much has been said about welfare effects. This is not surprising: as equation (36) 
indicates, specific welfare conclusions should depend on the particular shape of the demand 
function ( )P Q  and on the distribution of technological opportunities ( )G ω . Also, our analytical 
results have been contingent on a few assumptions: that clean energy cannot capture the entire 
market (Condition 1), that it is on the cusp of being competitive with (taxed) fossil fuels (Condition 
2), and that the mandate is always binding (Conditions 4 and 5). In this section we relax these 
conditions and specify explicit functional forms for ( )P Q  and ( )G ω  so that we may consider 
welfare effects by means of a numerical analysis.  
6.1 Parameterization 
We begin by normalizing 1 100c = , so that a tax on dirty energy can be interpreted as a percent of 
the laissez-faire price level. In the baseline parameterization the externality is calibrated to 20x = , so 
that it amounts to 20% of the private cost of dirty energy,5 and we put 2 120c = , consistent with 
                                                          
5 This value for the externality cost is meant to be somewhat representative of estimates for the 
social cost of carbon relative to the cost of transportation fuel. The US government’s estimate for 
the 2015 social cost of carbon, in 2007 dollars, is $37/ton of CO2 if a 3% discount rate is used, and 
$57/ton of CO2 if a 2.5% discount rate is used (US Government 2013, p. 3). These discount rates 
have been criticized for being too high (Johnson and Hope 2012), and so we use the figure 
associated with the lower 2.5% discount rate as our baseline. Converting this estimate to 2015 
dollars yields a social cost of $65/ton of CO2. The carbon emission coefficient is 8.9 kg CO2/gallon 
of gasoline (EPA 2014), which implies a social cost of carbon is $0.58 per gallon. Taking the 
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Condition 2 (but this condition does not hold when the marginal damage x is changed from its 
baseline value). Next, we postulate the inverse demand function ( ) ( ln )p Q a Q b= −  or, equivalently, 
that the direct demand function for energy takes the semi-log form:  
lnQ a bp= −               (43) 
This is a convenient parameterization which, among other desirable features, can accommodate 
various hypotheses concerning demand elasticity ln lnQ pη ≡ −∂ ∂ . For or this function bpη = , 
hence the parameter b  can be varied to implement alternative elasticity values. The parameter a  is 
calibrated so that total demand for energy at price 1p c=  (and at the baseline elasticity value) is equal 
to 100Q = , that is we put 1 ln100a bc= + . This normalization means that we can interpret the level 
of mandates as the percent of total demand under a laissez-faire policy. As for ( )G ω , we assume that 
ω  is distributed on [ ]0,ω  by an appropriately scaled beta distribution. The probability density 
function ( )g ω  is therefore given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1; , / 1 /g α βω α β ω ω ω ω− −∝ −    (44) 
where the parameters α  and β  determine the moments of this distribution and govern its shape. 
This distribution is very flexible, and alternative choices of α  and β  can yield both symmetric and 
skewed density functions. We normalize 120ω =  so that, under all possible innovation, the marginal 
cost of clean energy remains non-negative everywhere. 
Given the foregoing functional form assumptions and parametric normalizations, we still have four 
free parameters that can be varied to gain some insights in the nature of the results. The first of 
these is the elasticity of demand η . Because this value depends on the evaluation price, for clarity we 
will always measure elasticity with reference to the laissez-faire price of energy, where 1p c= . For our 
baseline, we set b  so that 0.5η = . We also consider the cases where 0.25η = and 1η = . Second, we 
vary the cost of the externality x . As noted, for the baseline we set 20x = , but we also consider the 
cases of 10x =  and 40x = . Third, we vary the R&D cost k . To calibrate this parameter we relate it 
to the magnitude of profits that innovation can produce in the laissez-faire baseline. Under the highest 
                                                          
benchmark price of gasoline to be $3.00/gallon, then the damage imposed by the carbon externality 
is approximately 20% of the cost of fuel, which is reflected in our baseline value of . 20x = . 
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level of technological opportunity, the expected profit for a single innovator, in view of (5) and the 
chosen normalizations, is equal to ( ) 6,250 9tπ ω = . We consider values of k  equal to 3%, 6%, and 
12% of this profit level, with 6% corresponding to the baseline. 
Fourth, we vary the shape of the distribution of technological opportunity ( )G ω . The first moment 
of the assumed beta distribution is [ ] ( )E ω ωα α β= + . We set 2α β+ =  and, by varying the 
parameters α  and β , we obtain both different values for [ ]E ω  and different shapes. The baseline 
parameters are 0.5α =  and 1.5β = , which yield [ ] 30E ω = . This is a positively skewed distribution 
(low draws of ω  are more likely than high ones), which reflects the belief that incremental 
innovation is generally more likely than major breakthroughs. The other two cases we consider are 
0.25α =  and 1.75β = , which yield [ ] 15E ω =  (and correspond to an even more positively skewed 
distribution), and 1α =  and 1β = , which yield [ ] 60E ω =  (and correspond to a uniform 
distribution where high draws of ω  are equally likely as low ones).  
As for the policies t  and Qˆ , for each set of parameters that we consider, we numerically solve for 
the value of the policy instrument that maximizes welfare (expected Marshallian surplus).  
6.2. Results  
The experiments we report, as described in the foregoing, encompass 43 81=  different parameter 
combinations. All calculation are coded in Matlab. Some basic descriptive results for the baseline 
parameters are reported in Table 1. For the single innovator case the expected number of innovators 
[ ]E n  can be interpreted as the probability that R&D will be conducted. In the baseline setting, 
under a laissez-faire policy, R&D is conducted with probability 0.25 for the single innovator case. The 
expected quality of innovation [ ]1E θ  is 9.66, which improves to 16.05 with multiple innovators. 
Hence, in either case the “average” technology under laissez faire is insufficient to compete with fossil 
fuels (the minimum inventive step here is ˆ 20θ = ). Still, some innovation does take place under 
laissez-faire, because some better-than-average draws are viable. The expected quantity of clean 
energy consumed is small but not negligible, at 2.64 and 8.94 under the single innovator and free 
entry conditions respectively (recall that the laissez-faire quantity of total energy consumed was 
normalized to 100). 
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Table 1. Numerical Results for Baseline 
 Laissez-Faire Mandate Carbon Tax 
 Single 
Innovator 
Free  
Entry 
Single 
Innovator 
Free  
Entry 
Single 
Innovator 
Free  
Entry 
Optimal 
instrument - - 18.65 16.05 23.45 23.40 
[ ]E n  0.25 1.52 0.78 2.66 0.56 3.08 
( )Var n   0.44 3.10 0.42 2.83 0.50 3.95 
[ ]1E θ  9.66 16.05 15.63 24.76 14.44 24.17 
1( )Var θ  20.59 30.15 19.8 28.16 20.45 29.95 
[ ]2E Q  2.64 8.94 18.66 21.68 9.76 23.32 
2( )Var Q  6.99 19.31 0.56 14 9.68 26.98 
[ ]E W  126 412 146 455 315 689 
( )Var W  421 997 369 993 544 1,114 
Note: the baseline parameters are 0.5η = , 10.2x c= , 0.06 ( )k π ω= , and 0.5α =  and 1.5β =  (i.e., 
[ ] 30E ω = ). 
An optimal policy (either a mandate or a tax) raises all these quantities, and also improves welfare. 
The expected quality of innovation [ ]1E θ  is also increased significantly, as well as the quantity of 
clean energy produced. Under an optimal mandate, the probability of R&D more than triples, 
relative to the laissez-faire case, and the expected number of innovators, given free entry, increases 
from 1.52 to 2.66. Compared with the carbon tax, the mandate induces a greater probability of 
innovation with a single innovator, but a carbon tax has a higher expected number of entrants when 
there is free entry. As discussed earlier, this is because a mandate provides comparatively strong 
incentives to conduct R&D when technological opportunity is low, and this induces firms to enter 
for more draws of ω  than under a carbon tax. The expected profit of R&D increases as ω  rises, but 
it increases at a faster rate for the carbon tax. In the single innovator case, this is irrelevant, since 
firms make a binary decision to conduct R&D or not. But in the free entry case, the higher profits of 
a carbon tax can support more innovators, and this leads to a higher overall expected number of 
entrants (3.08 in a carbon tax, compared to 2.66 under a mandate). The expected quality of 
innovation, however, is actually higher under a mandate in each case. In the free entry case, this 
stems from the differential impact of entrants. Consistent with Result 6, we note that carbon taxes 
will tend to have more disperse results than the mandate, inducing either many innovators or none 
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at all. Because [ ]1 ,E n nθ ω∂ ∂  is decreasing in n , the marginal impact of additional entrants under a 
tax when ω  is high (and there are already many firms) is lower than that of additional entrants under 
a mandate when ω  is low (and there are few or no entrants). 
The expected quantity of clean energy produced is higher under a mandate, when there is a single 
innovator, but higher under a carbon tax in the free entry case. However, in both single and multiple 
innovators cases, welfare is higher under an optimal carbon tax.6 In fact, this is a general numerical 
result, and we have found it to be true beyond the baseline.  
RESULT 7 (NUMERICAL). In all parametric combinations that we considered, expected 
welfare under the optimal mandate is always lower than under the optimal carbon tax. 
Result 7 refers to 81 different parameter combinations, each of which is solved under single 
innovator and free entry conditions. This result suggests that an optimal mandate, while it improves 
welfare relative to laissez-faire, is inferior to an optimal carbon tax.  
To gain further insights into the performance of an optimal mandate, relative to both laissez-faire and 
a carbon tax, Table 2 illustrates the sensitivity of optimal policies to changes in the calibrated 
parameters. The first row of Table 2 reiterates the optimal policies for the baseline parameterization 
reported in Table 1. Each subsequent row presumes the same parameters as the baseline, except 
along one dimension. For example, in the second row the elasticity of demand, evaluated at the 
laissez-faire price, is changed to 0.25η = . It is apparent that, across columns, the optimal mandate is 
considerably more variable that the optimal carbon tax. This suggests the optimal choice of a 
mandate is sensitive to information about the innovation context, about which policy makers might 
be less informed than innovators. This conclusion is buttressed by the last two lines of Table 2, 
which give the optimal policies when the outlook for technological innovation is altered. If this 
outlook improves from [ ] 30E ω =  to [ ] 60E ω = , the optimal mandate increases by 69% in the 
single innovator case and 108% in the free entry case, whereas the optimal carbon tax increases by 
25% and 6%, respectively. There is a similarly large divergence when technological opportunity 
decreases to [ ] 15E ω = . 
                                                          
6 Throughout, welfare is measure as expected Marshallian surplus, normalized to zero at the pre-
innovation, laissez-faire case. 
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Table 2. Optimal Policy Instruments Under Alternative Assumptions 
 Optimal Mandate Optimal Carbon Tax 
 No 
Innovation 
Single 
Innovator 
Free  
Entry 
No 
Innovation 
Single 
Innovator 
Free 
Entry 
Baseline 2.4 18.6 16.0 20.0 23.5 23.4 
0.25η =   1.1 1.5 13.3 20.0 24.4 23.4 
1η =   5.2 15.2 16.0 20.0 22.5 22.7 
10x =   0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 10.0 14.0 14.4 
40x =  30.3 41.8 47.0 40.0 47.8 42.8 
0.03k π=   2.4 18.6 16.6 20.0 23.9 22.3 
0.12k π=  2.4 18.1 16.0 20.0 23.0 24.0 
[ ] 15E ω =  2.4 9.5 10.0 20.0 21.7 21.8 
[ ] 60E ω =   2.4 31.4 33.3 20.0 29.3 24.8 
Note: Each row changes one parameter, all other parameters as in the baseline. 
         * reflects rounding (optimal mandates are strictly positive)  
 
In view of the fact, illustrated in Table 2, that the optimal carbon tax is less sensitive to the 
innovation context than the optimal mandate, we also compared the performance of the naïve 
carbon tax t x=  (which, strictly speaking, is optimal only without the prospect of innovation) with 
the optimal mandate. This comparison is of some interest, in an applied policy context, because the 
information requirement to compute this tax level is clearly much lower than required by the optimal 
instruments. It turns out that, for the multiple-innovators case, even the naïve carbon tax dominates 
the optimal mandate in terms of welfare.7  
RESULT 8 (NUMERICAL). When the number of innovators is endogenous, for all parametric 
combinations that we considered, expected welfare under the optimal mandate is always 
lower than under the naïve carbon tax.  
Whereas Table 2 illustrates that the magnitude of an optimal policy is more sensitive to information 
about innovation under a mandate than under a carbon tax, Table 3 illustrates that welfare outcomes 
are also more sensitive. In this table we decompose the total welfare change * 01 0W W− , where *1W  
                                                          
7 In the single-innovator case, expected welfare was higher with the optimal mandate than with the 
naïve carbon tax for 3 of the 81 parameters combinations that we considered.   
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is the expected welfare with innovation under the optimal instrument choice (either mandate or 
carbon tax, all for the multiple-innovators case), and 00W  is welfare under laissez-faire and no 
innovation. The decomposition identifies the following four components: 
0 0
1 0W W−  : The gain in expected welfare due to innovation under laissez-faire ; 
0
0 0
nW W−  : The “static” gain in expected welfare with a “naïve” level of the policy instrument 
(i.e., one that does not account for the prospect of innovation); 
0 0
1 0 1 0( ) ( )n nW W W W− − −  : The additional gain in expected welfare, relative to laissez-faire, due 
to policy-supported innovation (with a naïve level of the instrument);  
*
1 1
nW W−  :  The additional gain in expected welfare from moving to an optimal level of the 
policy instrument. 
 
Table 3. Welfare Decomposition under Alternative Assumptions (Free Entry) 
  Decomposition Total 
 
Policy 0 01 0W W−  00 0nW W−  
1 0
0 0
1 0
( )
( )
n nW W
W W
−
− −
 *1 1nW W−  
* 0
1 0W W−  
Baseline Mandate 412 2 3 37 455 Tax 412 97 173 7 689 
0.25η =  Mandate 412 1 2 25 440 
Tax 412 49 173 8 643 
1η =  Mandate 347 11 15 35 408 
Tax 347 76 98 5 526 
10x =  Mandate 323 0 0 0 323 Tax 323 25 56 9 412 
40x =  Mandate 591 400 178 128 1,297 Tax 591 575 497 7 1,670 
0.03k π=  Mandate 517 2 5 39 564 Tax 517 97 166 4 784 
0.12k π=  Mandate 288 2 4 28 322 Tax 288 97 172 9 567 
[ ] 15E ω =  Mandate 179 2 2 13 196 Tax 179 97 99 3 377 
[ ] 60E ω =  Mandate 1,364 2 3 103 1,473 Tax 1,364 97 317 14 1,791 
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The largest component of the decomposition is the first column, which gives the gain in expected 
welfare from innovation in a laissez-faire setting. This feature is of some interest per se, as it 
emphasizes that the market mechanisms that rationalize the use of policy instruments to spur 
innovation also work, to a degree, when no such support is present. Under both policies being 
considered, the gains from policy-supported innovation, 0 01 0 1 0( ) ( )n nW W W W− − − , are generally as 
large or larger than the gains due to the static increase in allocative efficiency, 00 0nW W− . The last 
column of the decomposition also has direct policy relevance, as it shows how much is gained from 
moving to an optimal policy that explicitly accounts for the prospect of innovation. This column 
indicates that the additional gain in welfare from moving to an optimal policy is small under a 
carbon tax.  In the baseline, welfare rises by 97 from the increase in allocative efficiency, by 173 
from additional innovation, but only by 7 when moving from the naïve carbon tax of 20 to the 
optimal carbon tax of 23.4. By contrast, under a mandate, the majority of the gain in welfare stems 
from moving from the no-innovation policy of 2.4 to the optimal policy of 16.0. A similar result 
obtains for each of our 9 scenarios: under a mandate, it really is important to tune the policy 
instrument in response to innovation, whereas with a carbon tax most of the welfare gain can be 
achieved with the naïve level of the policy instrument.  
7. Conclusion  
The direct impact of most environmental policy tools, such as carbon taxes and pollution permits, is 
to promote the internalization of the external costs of pollution: the reduction of social cost of 
pollution is achieved by increasing the private cost of (some) agents. It has long been recognized 
that the privatization of these costs, in addition to ameliorating the externality effect from a static 
perspective, also has an important dynamic implications because it creates R&D incentives via the 
so-called induced innovation hypothesis. In this paper we have applied this perspective to the 
analysis of “mandates,” a policy tool that is becoming increasing popular in renewable energy 
contexts. 
We find that mandates can in fact improve upon laissez faire, and that the prospect of innovation 
increases the optimal mandate level. The innovation effects are critical and account for most of the 
desirable welfare impacts of this policy tool. Our numerical results, however, indicate that an 
optimally calibrated mandate may be much more sensitive to assumptions about innovation, such as 
the number of potential innovators and the outlook for technological opportunity, than 
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characteristics of demand and the size of the externality. In general, the more promising is 
innovation, the higher the mandate ought to be. Indeed, the optimal mandate is such that it would 
typically induce welfare losses in the status quo without innovation. In any event, we find that the 
optimal mandate policy, although it is better than laissez faire, is clearly dominated by a carbon tax 
policy. 
A novel contribution of our paper, stemming from the explicit stochastic innovation framework that 
we have developed, is to shed some light on the extent to which alternative policies matter for the 
distribution of the quality of innovation. In our setting, whereas policies are set based on the entire 
distribution of possible R&D outlooks, innovators observe a signal on the actual innovation 
prospects before making their R&D investment. Compared with a mandate, a carbon tax tends to 
create high profit opportunities when the outlook for R&D turns out to be very good, which 
induces a flurry of activity that makes the realization of the good innovation outcome likely. 
Conversely, when the outlook for R&D is weak, mandates may provide more incentive for 
innovation. Hence, mandates may be a useful policy tool to incentivize R&D when only minor 
innovations are attainable (or, as for the case of corn-based ethanol mentioned in the introduction, 
when one deals with a mature technology so that the problem at hand is to promote adoption of 
existing technologies). But when the goal is to promote breakthrough innovations, as for the cited 
example of advanced biofuels, it seems that a carbon tax is preferable to mandates. We note that our 
qualitative conclusions appear consistent with an emerging empirical literature in renewable energy 
which shows that quantity-based policies have positive and statistically significant predictors of 
innovation only for older technologies, whereas price-based policies have positive and statistically 
significant impact for younger technologies (Johnstone, Hascic and Popp 2010). 
Whereas mandates may be less effective at spurring innovation for breakthrough technologies, their 
superior ability to induce innovation when incremental innovation is more likely may make them 
desirable in some settings. For example, if learning-by-doing is believed to be an important source of 
technological advance in a field, then it may be more desirable to guarantee that there is some kind of 
innovation, even if it is of low quality, so that the dynamics of learning-by-doing can get started. 
Alternatively, when innovation proceeds in many incremental steps, mandates may provide higher 
incentives than a carbon tax for each step in isolation. Whether this translates into a better policy to 
promote innovation, however, further depends on the extent to which the patent system allows early 
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innovators to capture a sufficient share of the profits from follow-on ideas, a somewhat distinct and 
complex issue in the economics of intellectual property rights (see, e.g., Scotchmer, 2004, chapter 5).  
These caveats notwithstanding, our results indicate that, as a policy to promote environmental 
innovation, mandates have real limitations. Mandates provide strong incentives for low-quality 
innovation, but often these are not particularly desirable. Our numerical results further substantiate 
that welfare with an optimal mandate policy is always lower than with an optimal carbon tax. Indeed, 
even a naïve carbon tax that is not optimized to account for the prospect of innovation typically 
outperforms an optimal mandate. 
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